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Aristotle’s Functionalism: Psyche’s Relevance to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 
 
Abstract 
While functionalism often attributes its roots to Aristotle’s On the Soul, contemporary 
philosophers of mind have left behind crucial features of Aristotle’s philosophy by losing his 
distinction between mind and soul. I propose a revision to our present concept of mind, instead 
situating it as an aspect of the Aristotelian concept of soul, which allows for a more robust 
account of functionalism that encompasses the entirety of the human being as a system of 
demonstrative, functional capacities. I argue that Aristotle’s applied theory of the nature of souls 
offers greater fecundity to discourse in philosophy of mind, specifically in discussions of the 
possibility of strong artificial intelligence, the contemporary movement across disciplines 
towards the externalized concept of mind, and in ameliorating some of the insurmountable 
critiques of alternate theories of mind. Furthermore, a thoroughly Aristotelian form of 
functionalism provides a possible solution the problem of holism, one of the major predicaments 
contemporary functionalism faces. The Aristotelian view of the mind qua soul is to be contrasted 
with Cartesian dualism as well as reductive materialism, as those are two historically-dominating 
theories of mind that have defined the way in which philosophers consider the mind. 
 
Background 
Reductive materialists hold that the existing universe is only comprised of matter; that is 
to say, “there is nothing over and above the physical”.1 Conversely, Descartes was the first to 
champion substance dualism, which distinguishes matter and mind as two distinctly different 
                                                          
1 Smart, “The Content of Physicalism” 
substances.2 This was the catalyst to a completely new understanding of the relationship between 
mind and body. Both materialism and dualism offer contributions towards our understanding of 
the nature of the mind; however, each faces significant obstacles that contemporary philosophers 
of mind have yet to ameliorate.3 
Thomas Nagel claims, “philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations 
of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though 
entirely different. This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the mental largely 
because they would permit familiar kinds of reduction.”4 Nagel recognizes the propensity for 
reductive materialism; however, there is a severe deficiency one faces when claiming mental 
states are fundamentally physical states: the inability to account for qualia, that is to say, for the 
specifically subjective experiential aspects of the world. The “hard problem of consciousness” 
defined by David Chalmers in 1995 demonstrates this continued struggle with explaining the 
relation between a seemingly non-material element of the mind and a material world.5 Chalmers 
offers that experience is itself a fundamental element of mind that is irreducible to a “more 
fundamental” material basis; however, Chalmers does not leap to granting experience, and 
therefore the subject of the experience, a separate ontological status from material. Instead, he 
only grants that this understanding of the mind and subject postulates foundations “over and 
above” matter. Chalmer’s “hard problem of consciousness” pulls from Thomas Nagel’s 1974 
paper, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, highlighting the difficulty of accounting for the subjective, 
                                                          
2 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy 
3  It is important at this point to recognize as well that for the sake of my argument, I will be focusing on Cartesian 
substance dualism and extreme reductive materialism, which can mean either identity theory or some form of 
eliminative materialism. While I do recognize there are more subtle and sophisticated versions of both dualism and 
materialism, for the sake of contrast, I will be focusing on the more extreme theories for each. 
4 Nagel, Thomas. “What is it Like to be a Bat?” 
5 Chalmers, David. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200- 19 
(1995) 
experiential element of consciousness.6 Nagel argues that, while we could behave as a bat 
behaves, hanging upside down, eating fruits, doing bat things, there is still something that would 
distinguish our experience of acting like a bat from being a bat. That is to say, there is 
something it is like to be a bat. Chalmers describes this subjective aspect as being distinctly 
experiential, stating:  
When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of 
redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual 
field….Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images 
that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a 
stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is 
something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.7 
 
Each of these elements of subjectivity indicates a subjectivity that would be insufficiently 
explained utilizing materialism.  
 Conversely, dualism has yet to offer a solution to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia’s 
counterargument to substance dualism.8 She posited that discussing causation from one 
substance to another is wildly problematic. In order for something to be non-physical, it cannot 
exist in space or presence in the material world, so the possibility of it having causal power on 
the tangible world requires a strange explanation. One is forced to mediate this mind-body 
interaction problem in order to explain the causal relationship between, for example, the body 
being hurt and the mind feeling pain.9  
                                                          
6 Nagel, Thomas. “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974), Chalmers, David. “Facing Up to the Hard 
Problem of Consciousness” (1995). 
7 Chalmers, David. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 
(1995) 
8 Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, 2007, The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of 
Bohemia and René Descartes, Lisa Shapiro (ed. and transl.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
9  It is worth pointing out here as well that this idea of the mind feeling pain as an experiential phenomenon is more 
than compatible with an Aristotelian understanding of the human, that is to say that it is the mind that is realizing the 
capacity to be in pain, rather than the c-fibers “experiencing” pain or a disconnected cogito that happens to 
experience the correlating bodily experiences of the subject. 
For both dualists and materialists, the largest theoretical obstacle is this relationship 
between mind and body, subjectivity and material objectivity, regardless of whether one grants a 
unique ontological status to the mind that sets it apart from the rest of the world.  
The basic premise of functionalism is that mind can be understood through the 
summation of three parts: environmental stimuli acting on the subject, mental states as a 
complex, interrelated system, and the consequent functional and behavioral outputs.10  A single 
mental state, then, is the node situated at the intersection between these three elements, with the 
mental state being defined purely in terms of the individual function it performs within the larger 
system.  
Functionalism’s historical foundations are often attributed to Aristotle. This basis can be 
found in his work De Anima (On the Soul), which defines the soul biologically, as stated, “... the 
(human) soul is to be identified with whichever powers and capacities enable a natural, 
organized human body to fulfill its defining function, which, according to Aristotle, is to survive 
and flourish as living, acting, perceiving, and reasoning being.”11 In this way, Aristotle 
establishes the foundations for an explanation of the relationship between the soul and the body 
that avoids the problems that have arisen in other theories of mind and soul across the following 
two thousand years.12  
One of the major aspects of functionalism that itself challenges a materialist framework is 
the concept of multiple realizability. This defines mental states in terms of roles realized in the 
                                                          
10 Piccinini, G. “Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states”, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 35:811-833 (2004) 
11  SEP Functionalism 2.1 Early Antecedents 
12 For the sake of this project, and for the sake of avoiding the possible materialist and dualist interpretations of 
functionalism that may be equivocated with this meaning, the functionalist interpretation I am defending is the 
Aristotelian functionalism put forth (and later clarified in their 1995 essay “Changing Aristotle’s Mind”) by Hilary 
Putnam and Martha Nussbaum. While there is considerable clash as to whether Aristotle is a functionalist in terms 
of contemporary functionalism, I will consider him a functionalist insofar as he exemplifies how a contemporary 
functionalist ought to be. 
world rather than physical composition. This distinguishes functionalism from materialism and 
dualism because of the possibility of this realization across material compositions. For the 
functionalist, the matter is not the sufficient cause of the mental state, but rather, is a necessary 
cause for it.13 
 
Psyche 
Aristotle recognizes ψυχή (psyche, soul) as the entirety of a living thing, the combination 
of all of its capacities to act within the world.14 That is to say, rather than defining the soul as 
immaterial and separable from the body, Aristotle defines the soul biologically. The soul is 
defined hierarchically based on these capacities, with plants possessing a nutritive soul, 
reflecting the ability to grow, reproduce, and take in nutrients. Animals have sensitive souls, as 
they have all of the capacities of plants, as well as the additional facility to move of their own 
volition and to perceive the world around them, both of which are necessary for them to interact 
with the world. Humans are the only living things with the capacity to think, reason, and 
imagine, in addition to all of those possessed by animals and plants. In this way, these capacities 
are necessarily realized from one “soul-tier” to the next, building in a way that allows for lower-
level faculties (consuming energy, reproduction) to exist without higher-level processes(desires, 
thoughts, sensations), but not vice-versa.  
Unlike the other metaphysical commitments of contemporary philosophy of mind, 
Aristotle’s psyche is conducive to recognizing the soul as distinguished from the body, without 
facing the mind-body problem. In De Anima, Aristotle states:  
                                                          
13 That is not necessarily to say that the matter is entirely irrelevant, and a mental state could be enacted through any 
material composition, but rather, is positing that pain can be realized through more than one material. 
14 Aristotle, De Anima, 413b7; b27—32 
It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary 
to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of 
each thing and that of which it is the matter are one.15 
  
Here Aristotle is discussing the inseparability of the psyche from its matter, that they are neither 
two separate things nor are they identical to one another; their inseparable juxtaposition just is 
what comprises an organism. Aristotle’s point that the mind and the body are two aspects of a 
single entity avoids the difficulty substance dualism has of accounting for the causal relation 
between the mind-substance and the body-substance. Rather than attempting to answer how a 
wax and its shape can be related, Aristotle finds this question to be incomprehensible; there is no 
causal relationship between the wax and its form, as they are one and the same.  
i. Nous 
As aforementioned, Aristotle says psyche throughout De Anima in reference to the 
entirety of the actualized soul, while using a different term to discuss the mind:  
νους (nous). Nous is characterized to be the intellect, or reason, of the person, considered to be 
the part of the soul that has the capacity to know and understand. This further distinguishes the 
mind to be functional in its definition, recognizing it as possessing capacities to be realized in 
function. Aristotle characterizes the mind by saying, “That part of the soul…which we call mind 
(by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgments) had no actual existence 
until it thinks.”16 This is to say, the mind just is the realization of our capacity to think and 
reason. While it ought to be acknowledged that Aristotle never specifically spoke of mental 
states as such, it seems this narrower understanding of the mind as specifically the part of us that 
contributes the capacities to think and utilize rationality offers a definitive view of the elements 
that distinguish humans as distinctly thinking creatures.  
                                                          
15 Aristotle, De Anima ii 1, 412b6-9 
16De Anima iii, p 165 
 Benefits of Adopting Psyche 
Richard Sorabji, in his article “Body and Soul in Aristotle”, defends the necessity for the 
continued utilization of “soul” in Aristotle because, as he says,  
The word ‘soul’ may sound archaic to some modern ears, and people may be 
tempted to substitute the word ‘mind’. But then they are likely to confine the 
functions of the soul to what we call mental acts, and this will take them away 
from Aristotle’s conception of the soul.17  
 
I take this point made by Sorabji to be a central tenet, as understanding Aristotle’s psyche 
requires us to abandon our contemporary interpretation of the soul as an archaic, spiritual entity 
in favor of an (admittedly counterintuitive) understanding of the soul deeply rooted in biology.  
While this may appear to be descriptive of the soul, rather than definitive, Richard 
Sorabji interprets, “Aristotle’s statement, that the most appropriate account of the soul is the one 
which picks out these capacities, already suggests the thought that perhaps the soul just is these 
capacities. This thought is confirmed when we notice that Aristotle speaks of the capacities as 
parts of the soul”. Moreover, in Aristotle’s own words, he demands a “non-aggregative form of 
unity” in discussing the nature of these capacities.18   
This understanding of the human as a series of realized capacities when added to 
functionalism has multifaceted implications on our understanding of the mind in the world. A 
deeply biological account of the soul, and therefore understanding of the mind and human 
consciousness, contributes additional necessary requirements for artificial intelligence to be 
recognized as such. This situates the role of non-mental, experienced phenomena and the 
relationship between animal cognition to human cognition as well. Additionally, adopting the 
biological psyche in conjunction with nous as realized capacities further situates the mind as a 
reflection of the movement in cognitive science and philosophy of mind toward externalized 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p 64 
18 De Anima ii 3 414b28-32, cf. iii 9 432a-b6 
(“E”) theories of mind. Lastly, this may offer a possible solution to the problem of holism 
obstructing functionalist theories.  
Alan Turing offered an inherently behaviorist account of artificial intelligence, positing 
the situation such that if a person were to have a conversation with a computer and found the 
computer indistinguishable from communication with another human being, this computer would 
be demonstrating human-like sentience. John Searle, in his Chinese Room argument, responded 
that if someone were in a room and had a complex enough set of instructions, one could claim to 
“know” Chinese without understanding a lick of it. That is to say, certain inputs of words in 
Chinese would have specific character responses that the person in the room could copy down in 
response. With enough complexity, the person inputting bits of conversational Chinese (who is 
presumably fluent in Chinese) would find the responses indistinguishable from another fluent 
Chinese speaker, all the while the individual inside has no necessary understanding of Chinese. 
The same could be applied to AI, says Searle, as behaving like a human could be achieved 
without internal processes of consciousness reflecting our own.  
To adopt Aristotle’s soul is to recognize that the communicative and computational 
elements of the human mind is conceptually dependent upon the fulfillment of necessary lower-
level capacities, such as the capacities to reproduce, take in nutrients, and grow. For these to be 
taken as necessary to having a rational soul, and therefore nous, it would then by extension be 
necessary for strong AI to realize these capacities as well. This would mean an artificially 
intelligent thing would have to realize all of the necessary functions and capacities of a human 
being, not just the performative element of conversational communication. This seems to reflect 
and cement a more succinct requirement for strong AI, as the Turing Test recognizes the 
importance of behavior, but does not seem to encompass the extent to which the consciousness 
seems to be intimately connected with the complexity of the human experience with the world. 
This ultimately has further interesting implications on the relationship between certain 
behaviors exhibited in both humans and animals that have not been understood in the context of 
life. An example that comes to mind is the understanding of sleep. Viewing living things as 
conglomerations of capacities rooted in biology, some of which being necessary to and definitive 
of the essence of the living thing, would offer a place in which sleep could be recognized as a 
necessarily-realized capacities within the sensitive soul (animals), and by extension, the rational 
soul (humans). This reflects our understanding of similarities in behavior between non-human 
animals and people, essentially validating experiences of the world that seem to cross the 
boundary between mental experiences (of feeling sleepy or tired, inability to concentrate or think 
at full capacity) and biological impulses (physical weakness, nodding off).  
The second addition this understanding of the soul offers is that this seems to ultimately 
be reflective of the movement in philosophy of mind and cognitive science toward “E” theories 
of mind. In other words, theories such as David Chalmers and Andy Clark’s “Extended Mind” 
thesis and others’ work in “Embedded”, “Embodied”, and “Enacted” cognition.19 In the case of 
extended mind, this is illustrated in the functional equivalence of some isolated minds to other 
minds acting in conjunction with an external aid. The example given in Chalmers’ essay is that 
of two people going to the museum for the day, one with a perfectly functioning memory and 
capability to arrive at the museum (Inga), the other with some sort of memory problems, 
                                                          
19 Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7-19; Thompson, Evan 
(2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press. Wilson, Robert 
A. and Foglia, Lucia, "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Spring 2017 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.). As these are each incredibly nuanced theories of mind, to attempt a thorough description of 
each would distract from the focus of this paper; however, the gist of each of these theories demonstrate a movement 
towards situating the mind into a larger context in relation to the environment.  
resulting in a dependence upon a notebook to aid him (Otto). If we are to understand the mind as 
functional, and one mind functions equivalently to another than utilizes an external aid, it would 
thus be understood that the mind would extend beyond physical limitations of the brain to 
encompass the external element (in this case, Otto’s notebook). The relationship with Aristotle’s 
psyche, then, is that through understanding the entirety of a person through such realized 
capacities as the ability to experience the world through sensation and move around in it, is to 
define what is it to be human in terms of a necessary relationship to the external world. 
According to Aristotle’s characterization, the possibility of the rational soul existing predicates 
upon an established, realized relationship with the external world. An enactivist, who would 
claim cognitive capacities are deeply interrelated and dependent upon interaction with the 
external world would I think be quite enthusiastic about the implications of Aristotle’s view of 
the soul, as the possibility of having a rational soul only arises once the capacities of the sensitive 
soul have been realized.  
The problem of holism in functionalism states that if the entire system of mental states 
that comprises our understanding of the mind requires the complex interconnection between 
various beliefs and internal states in order to exhibit any one mental state; other people who do 
not share the same internal states would be incapable of expressing the same mental states as 
another person. Considering functionalism relies on this interdependence of mental states to 
define the mind, any variation in individual mental states results in this change in the 
composition of the whole structure. That is to say, if holism is true, with one slight variation in 
mental states, two individuals who both believe that it is raining in Oregon today would be 
unable to have the exact same belief, despite it appearing that they ought to be able to. This 
destabilizes our ability to discuss the mind as a universally applicable concept to humanity, as 
each representation of the mind would be defined by a variety of different systems. In order to 
define the mind, there must be a cohesion across all minds, regardless of whether that coherence 
is based in functionalism or not. This cohesion, with the addition of the psyche, could be thought 
of through these underlying capacities. Having a static conglomeration of capacities groups all 
people together as being fundamentally the same, while allowing for the differences holism 
posits in the realization of those capacities.  
 
Conclusion 
Functionalism steers a middle path between extreme reductive materialism and Cartesian 
dualism in a way that quite clearly parallels Aristotle’s discussion of the soul. This offers a 
mechanism for understanding our place in the world beyond reductive means without making 
assumptions about the nature of the mind. Ultimately, Aristotle’s concept of psyche results in a 
theory of mind consistent with contemporary understandings of the relationship between mind 
and its environment, a notion that is altogether novel in its antiquity. Although an Aristotelian 
view of mind, soul, and matter may not be the absolute answer to all future enquiry, revisiting his 
metaphysics and psychology has demonstrable benefits conducive to the movements in 
philosophy of mind in cognitive science surrounding “E” theories of mind, a more thorough 
recognition of the relationship between the mind as soul as capacities and the recognition of its 
effects in the world, the reimagining of how we can tackle the problems functionalism faces, and 
ultimately, a fresh perspective devoid of entrenchment, through which we can recognize that 
materialism and dualism are not exhaustive options for understanding the mind.  
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